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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE ILLINOIS
POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT
INTRODUCTION
The notion that the State has broad autonomy in the formulation and control of its criminal procedure is fundamental to our
federal system. The primary limitation placed upon the State's
interest is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The State must provide an adequate procedure by which
federal claims of constitutional violation can 'be raised and adjudicated. 2
The post-conviction remedies available in Illinois did not always conform to this requirement. In 1947, at a time when the
United States Supreme Court was inundated with habeas corpus
and certiorari petitions from Illinois prisoners, three justices of
that court termed the Illinois practice a "merry-go-round," a
"procedural labyrinth. . . made up entirely of blind alleys." s
At that time Illinois provided for three post-conviction remedies: writ of error, a statutory substitute for the common law
writ of error coram nobis, and state habeas corpus. Because of
the technical restrictions placed upon each remedy, the Illinois
Attorney General was able to confront indigent prisoners with
4
the argument that they had pursued the wrong remedy.
The turning point came in Marino v. Ragen 5 in which the
Illinois Attorney General confessed error before the United States
Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Rutledge castigated the Illinois
post-conviction procedure in a concurring opinion:
The trouble with Illinois is not that it offers no procedure.
It is that it offers too many, and makes them so intricate and
ineffective that in practical effect they amount to none. The
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. An apt statement of this principle is provided in Carter v. Illinois,

329 U.S. 173, 175, 176 (1946).
A State must give one whom it deprives of his freedom the opportunity to open an inquiry into the intrinsic fairness of a criminal
rocess ....

Questions of fundamental justice protected by the

Due Process Clause may be raised ...dehors the record....

...So long as the rights under the United States Constitution

may be pursued, it is for a State and not for this Court to define the
mode by which they may be vindicated.
3. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563, 567-70 (1947) (concurring
opinion).
4. The historical background can be found in an article by Albert
E. Jenner, Jr., The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.R.D. 347
[hereinafter cited as JENNER]. See also Leighton, Post-Conviction Remedies in Illinois Criminal Procedure, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 540, 566-70 [hereinafter cited as LEIGHTON]; Katz, An Open Letter to the Attorney General
of Illinois, 15 U. CIL L REV. 251 (1948).

5. 332 U.S.561 (1947).

130

The John Marshall Journal of Practiceand Procedure [Vol. 8:129

possibility of
substantially
mathematical
dural ruling
followed. 6

securing effective determination on the merits is
foreclosed by the probability, indeed the all but
certainty, that the case will go off on the procethat the wrong one of several remedies has been

The Illinois legislature's response was the passage of the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 7 The Act was designed to provide
a remedy by which federal and state constitutional violations
could be raised and adjudicated in a collateral proceeding.
A cursory glance at the reported opinions in Illinois reveals
an enormous number of petitions filed under the Act. Because
of its unique statutory purposes, some courts have termed the
post-conviction proceeding sui generis s The proceeding is civil
in nature,9 but is not governed by the Civil Practice Act; 10 yet,
the function of the remedy is to review an existing judgment entered in a criminal case. For these reasons, it is useful to the
practicing 'bar to fully understand the procedures which govern
the post-conviction proceeding.
OTHER COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS

In Illinois there are three post-judgment collateral proceedings" 'by which a defendant may obtain relief from a judgment
in a criminal case. These include the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act,' 2 the writ of habeas corpus,' 8 and the petition under Section
72 of the Civil Practice Act.' 4 In order to determine the scope
of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, it is helpful to consider the
others briefly.
6. Id. at 565 (concurring opinion).
7. Act of Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 38, §§ 826-32, [1949] Ill. Laws 66th Sess.
722.

8. People v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 2d 39, 280 N.E.2d 433 (1972); People v.
Myers, 44 Ill. 2d 327, 255 N.E.2d 392 (1970); People v. Clements, 38 Ill.
2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967); People v. Airmers, 34 Ill. 2d 222, 215 N.E.2d
225 (1966); People v. Bernatowicz, 413 Ill. 181, 108 N.E.2d 479 (1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 928 (1953).
9. People v. Caise, 38 Ill. 2d 486, 231 N.E.2d 596 (1967); People v.
Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967); People v. Wilson, 37 Ill.
2d 617, 230 N.E.2d 194 (1967); People v. Alden, 15 Ill. 2d 498, 155 N.E.2d
617 (1959); People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953).
10. People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967).
11. The term is borrowed from LEIGHTON, supra note 4. The author
has divided post-conviction remedies into two broad categories: the posttrial motions and-the post-judgment proceedings. The post-trial motions
are further subdivided to include the motion for a new trial and the motion in arrest of judgment. The post-judgment proceedings are divided
into direct and collateral attacks. Post-judgment direct proceedings include the motion to vacate judgment and the appeal. The other postjudgment proceedings are collateral attacks and are considered here.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to 122-7 (1973). The entire Act
is set forth in the Appendix.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, § 1 et seq. (1973).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1973).
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. The petition provided for in Section 7215 of the Civil Practice
Act is available for all relief formerly given under the motion
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis. The petition can
bring before the court only such matters of fact not appearing
of record, which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would have prevented its rendition. 16 The errors of fact
for which the remedy is available include duress, fraud, disability
and incompetence. Thus, for example, when the defendant was
insane, but the court proceeded on the assumption that the defendant was sane, a petition under Section 72 is an appropriate
17
remedy.
The petition under Section 72 cannot be used to raise errors
made by the court on questions of law,' 8 nor can the petition be
used to correct errors appearing of record. 19 Thus, constitutional
violations cannot be raised if the claim involves a fact which
was known to the trial court. These errors are resolved by appeal or other post-trial motions.
The ancient origins of the writ of habeas corpus are preserved by the state and federal constitutions and by statute in
Illinois. 20 The Illinois Habeas Corpus Act provides that every
person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty may
prosecute the writ to obtain relief from such imprisonment, if it
can be proven that the incarceration is unlawful. 21 The objective
of the writ is immediate relief from illegal confinement. 22 Thus,
habeas corpus is available when the court which entered judgment lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. 23 Non-jurisdictional constitutional claims, however, cannot be raised in a
24
habeas corpus petition.
SCOPE OF THE ACT

The post-conviction proceeding is available to assert substantial denials of rights under either the federal or state constitution. A denial is not substantial unless prejudice results,
15. Id.

16.

LEIGHTrON,

17. Id. at 566.

supra note 4, at 565-66.

18. People v. Schuedter, 336 Ill. 244, 168 N.E. 323 (1929).
19. People v. Thon, 374 Ill. 624, 30 N.E.2d 54 (1940).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1970); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 65, § 1 et seq. (1973). In Illinois the origin of the writ of habeas

corpus dates back to the Northwest Ordinance. Ordinance of 1787, art.
II, enacted by Congress under the Articles of Confederation, July 13,
1787, 1 Stat. 51.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, § 1 (1973).
22. LEIGHTON, supra note 4, at 579.
23. People ex rel. St. George v. Woods, 47 Ill. 2d 261, 265 N.E.2d 164
(1970).
24. People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski, 38 Ill. 2d 396, 398, 231 N.E.2d
433, 434 (1967).
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without which the outcome would probably have been different.2 5 A constitutional violation which fails to meet this stand26
ard will result in a dismissal of the petition.
Although Section 122-1 of the Act states that a post-conviction proceeding is available to "[a]ny person imprisoned in
the penitentiary, ' 27 this provision has not been construed literally. 2
Thus, in People v. Davis, 2 9 the petitioner had been
incarcerated at the time the petition was filed, 'but the postconviction hearing was not held until after the petitioner had
been discharged from the penitentiary. The supreme court held
that a post-conviction proceeding should not be denied "in every
case in which the petition is not filed and the hearing completed
before imprisonment ends." 0 This holding was reaffirmed in
People v. Neber.31 There, as in Davis, the petition was filed at
a time when the petitioner was incarcerated. In Neber, the postconviction judge had erred in failing to appoint counsel after the
petitioner had made a proper request.8 2 The supreme court remanded the case for further proceedings, although the petitioner
had by this time completed his sentence.
Both
tion was
prisoned
parently,
was filed

Neber and Davis presented situations in which the petinot held moot even though the petitioner was not imthroughout the entire post-conviction proceeding. Apthe petitioner's incarceration at the time the petition
provided sufficient connection to invoke the Act.83

25. People v. Logue, 45 Ill. 2d 170, 258 N.E.2d 323 (1970); People v.
Bliss, 44 Ill. 2d 363, 255 N.E.2d 405 (1970).
26. Although not expressly stated by the courts, the dismissal in
these circumstances represents an application of the harmless error rule.
See note 210 infra.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973).
28. The supreme court, pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction, has
also fashioned a post-conviction remedy applicable to misdemeanants. In
People v. Warr, 54 Ill. 2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973), the court described
this remedy as a "proceeding in the nature of a proceeding under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act," which would generally be governed by
the same Act. The remedy as applied to misdemeanants is modified in
the following respects:
A. The defendant need not be imprisoned;
B. The proceeding shall be commenced within four months after
rendition of final judgment if judgment was entered upon a plea of
guilty, and within six months after the rendition of final judgment
following a trial upon a plea of not guilty; and,
C. Counsel need not be appointed to represent an indigent defendant if the trial judge, after examination of the petition enters an
order finding that the record in the case, read in conjunction with
the defendant's petition and the responsive pleading of the prosecution, if any, conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no
relief. Id. at 492, 298 N.E.2d at 166-67.
29. 39 Ill. 2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968).
30. Id. at 329, 235 N.E.2d at 636.
31. 41111. 2d 126, 242 N.E.2d 179 (1968).
32. Notes 84-86 infra & accompanying text.
33. Accord, People v. Bain, 10 Ill. App. 3d 363, 293 N.E.2d 758 (1973).
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People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey3 4 provides an illustration
of a case in which the "petition" was held moot. In Palmer, on
facts substantially similar to those in Neber and Davis, the supreme court upheld the dismissal of the "petition," although
otherwise meritorious grounds were present.35 The basis for the
decision was that the petitioner was no longer imprisoned at the
time of the oral arguments before the supreme court. The language in the opinion slightly modified that used in Davis: ".
the fact that [the] . . . term of imprisonment has ended does not
of itself serve to bar the institution of post-conviction proceed36
ings."
Although the "petition" in Palmer was held moot, the court
did not elaborate upon the circumstances which would produce
this result. It may be that the absence of such factors as the
delay occasioned in Davis, or the refusal to appoint counsel in
Neber, could bar the hearing in a post-conviction proceeding
when the term of imprisonment has been completed. This view
would limit the holdings in Neber and Davis. Without distinguishing these cases, Palmer impliedly rejects such an interpretation because in this case the court also had refused to ap37
point counsel.
In Palmer, the "post-conviction petition" was in actuality a
pro se petition requesting habeas corpus but alleging inadequate
grounds. The allegations would have been appropriate in a postconviction petition. The trial court dismissed on the authority
of People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski38s and People ex rel. Lewis
v. Frye.3 9 In those cases, the court had held that the post-conviction judge was riot required to disregard an improperly labeled
petition and treat it as a post-conviction petition.
Thus, the question presented was whether to affirm these
previous holdings. The court rejected its prior position, stating
as follows:
A salutary result, consistent with the intent of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act . . ., would be achieved if the circuit court,
upon finding that a pro se petition however labeled, and however
34. 53 Ill. 2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973).

35. Notes 38-40 infra & accompanying text.

36. 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484, 292 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1973).

It is doubtful

whether this language would permit the filing of a petition when the petitioner is not imprisoned. In People v. Bain, 10 Ill. App. 3d 363, 293 N.E.
2d 758 (1973), the court stated that Section 122-1 refers to "a person being incarcerated at the time he institutes a post-conviction proceeding."
Id. at 364, 293 N.E.2d at 760 (emphasis by court).
37. As will be seen, the "petition" in Palmer was labeled habeas corpus. Since counsel need not be appointed to indigents seeking state
habeas corpus, Palmer could also provide support for the view that

Neber and Davis are limited to their facts.
38. 38 Ill. 2d 396, 231 N.E.2d 433 (1967).
39. 42 Ill. 2d 58, 245 N.E.2d 483 (1969).
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inartfully drawn, alleged violations of the petitioner's rights cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, would thereafter, for all
purposes, treat it as such ....40
Since the judgment was affirmed on other grounds, 41 the
court's rejection of its previous holdings was unnecessary to the
disposition of the case. Thus, its holding on this point was dicta.
Nonetheless, the decision reflects the court's belief that a petition
should be judged on its substance, rather than on the label placed
upon it.
The Act requires that the alleged constitutional violations
must occur "in the proceedings which resulted in [the petitioner's] conviction. '42 This language implies that errors occurring
subsequent to the entry of conviction cannot be considered in a
post-conviction proceeding. The case of People v. Pier dispels
this notion with respect to constitutional violations occurring
43
during probation revocation hearings.
In Pier, the defendant had been placed on probation after
a burglary conviction. Charges were later filed, alleging a violation of probation which the defendant subsequently admitted.
At the hearing, the judge revoked the defendant's probation.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his admission was induced by the State's Attorney's unfulfilled promise to recommend a lighter sentence than he actually received.
The State contended that the probation revocation hearings
were not involved in the defendant's conviction, rather, that the
proceedings were related to matters which occurred subsequently. Therefore, any errors involved in the probation revocation hearing could not be considered in a post-conviction proceeding.
The supreme court felt that the view advanced by the State
did not comport with the Criminal Code definition of "conviction"--a "judgment of conviction or sentence. '44 The court concluded that a post-conviction petition may properly allege constitutional violations "which [arise] in proceedings concerning
'45
the imposition of the sentence.
40. 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484, 292 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1973).
41. Notes 34-36 supra & accompanying text.
42. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973). Matters arising in proceedings pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, id. § 105-1.01 et
seq., are not cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding. Violators of that
Act are not imprisoned pursuant to a conviction; they are committed to
the Department of Public Safety. People v. Lindsey, 45 Ill. 2d 115, 256
N.E.2d 808 (1970).
43. 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1972).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-5 (1973).
45. 51 Ill. 2d 96, 98, 281 N.E.2d 289, 290 (1972); see People v. Clark,
48 Ill. 2d 554, 272 N.E.2d 10 (1971); People v. Franciere, 47 Ill. App. 2d
436, 198 N.E.2d 170 (1964) (implicitly overruled by Pier).

19741

Post-Conviction Hearing Act

Errors committed by reviewing courts 46 or by parole boards 47
may not form the basis for a post-conviction proceeding. These
matters are not related to the proceedings which resulted in con48
viction.
PROCEDURE UNDER THE ACT

The Petition
The function of pleadings in a post-conviction proceeding is
to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing.49 Stated another way, "[t] he standing of a petitioner
must appear from the allegations of the petition."5
A proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is commenced by filing, with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place, a petition, verified by affidavit. 51 The petitioner
must also serve a copy of the petition upon the State's Attorney. 52 The clerk is required to docket the petition and bring it
promptly to the attention of the court." If the petition alleges
that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding,
leave of court must be obtained to proceed in forma pauperis.
54
Until such an order is signed, the petition cannot be docketed.
46. People v. Johndrow, 40 Ill. 2d 288, 239 N.E.2d 853 (1968).
47. People v. Ferree, 40 Ill. 2d 483, 240 N.E.2d 673 (1968).
48. Accord, People v. Barber, 51 Ill. 2d 268, 281 N.E.2d 676 (1972);
People v. Calhoun, 46 Ill. 2d 60, 263 N.E.2d 69 (1970) (proceeding under
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, § 18 et seq.
(1973)); People v. Fuca, 43 Ill. 2d 182, 251 N.E.2d 239 (1969) (hearings
in aggravation and mitigation); People v. Buford, 4 Ill. App. 3d 533, 281
N.E.2d 345 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973).
49. E.g., People v. Derengowski, 44 Ill. 2d 476, 256 N.E.2d 455 (1970);
People v. Collins, 39 Ill. 2d 286, 235 N.E.2d 570 (1968); People v. Airmers,
34 Ill. 2d 222, 215 N.E.2d 225 (1966).
50. LEIGHTON, supra note 4, at 573.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973). Cook County Circuit Court
Rule 17.4 (a) (i) provides that the original petition and a copy are filed
with the clerk of the Criminal Division, accompanied by the docket fee.
Where the petitioner has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the docket fee is not required. Rule 17.4 (a) (iii) & (iv). See also
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). Rule 17.4(b) requires the clerk
to maintain records of petitions as prescribed by general administrative
order.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973). The statute provides that
service may be achieved by any method prescribed by Supreme Court
Rule 11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 11 (1973). See also Cook County
Circuit Court Rule 17.4 (a) (ii) to the same effect.
Appointed counsel need not be concerned with the initial petition,
which is often filed pro se, the docket fee or proof of service since these
matters are usually completed prior to counsel's entry in the case. Where
subsequent pleadings are filed, as for example an amended petition, service must be made upon the State's Attorney. According to JENNER, supra note 4, at 359, service is not to be considered an integral part of
the actual commencement of the proceedings.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973). The proper remedy to pursue if the circuit court, its clerk, or the State's Attorney fail to process
and take action upon a post-conviction petition is mandamus. People ex
rel. Cook v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 270, 246 N.E.2d 254 (1969).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1973).
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If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that he is without
means to procure counsel, the petition should state whether appointed counsel is desired. 5 5
The petition must identify the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted and the date the final judgment was entered. All previous proceedings brought by the petitioner to secure relief from the conviction must be set forth in the petition.
Also, argument, citations and discussion of authorities should be
omitted from the petition. 56
The petition must be based on factual allegations5 7 rather
than mere conclusions.5 8 Affidavits, copies of records,5 9 or other
relevant evidence must be attached to the petition in substantiation of its factual claims. If no such documents have been attached, the petition must explain their absence. 60
The petition must allege facts showing a substantial denial
of constitutional rights, under either the federal or state constitution or both.6 ' Whenever the factual allegations, assumed to
be true, do not reveal a constitutional violation, the petition is
subject to a motion to dismiss. The right to a hearing is not,
however, solely dependent upon whether a constitutional denial
has been properly alleged. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
court may base its decision on the contents of the petition read
6 2
in conjunction with the trial transcript.
Where the allegations
of the petition are contradicted by the record, the petition is sub6 8
ject to dismissal.
Where, for example, no direct appeal has been taken, the petitioner's claims may be based on matters of record. In such a
case, no extrinsic evidence is required, and the absence of accompanying affidavits may be sufficiently explained, provided the alleged constitutional denials are substantially borne out by matters appearing of record. Thus, in People v. Reeves,6 4 prior to
55. Id. In Cook County, an affidavit must be attached to the petition

by counsel that his services are being rendered gratuitously, if the peti-

tion is in forma pauperis and the petitioner is represented by counsel of
his own choice. Cook County Circuit Court Rule 17.4(a) (iii).
56. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-2 (1973).
57. People v. Hysell, 48 Ill. 2d 522, 272 N.E.2d 38 (1971); People v.
Orndoff, 39 Ill. 2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 378 (1968).
58. E.g., People v. Olson, 46 Ill. 2d 167, 263 N.E.2d 92 (1970).
59. Supreme Court Rule 471 requires that an indigent post-conviction
petitioner be supplied with a copy of the transcript of his trial. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 471 (1973).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-2 (1973).

61. Id. § 122-1. The remedy is not available to assert the deprivation

of a right attributable either to statute or court rule. See, e.g., People
v. Covington, 45 Ill. 2d 105, 257 N.E.2d 106 (1970); People v. Gardner,
8 Ill. App. 3d 588, 289 N.E.2d 638 (1972).
62. People v. Bliss, 44 Ill. 2d 363, 255 N.E.2d 405 (1970); People v.

Slicker, 42 Ill. 2d 307, 247 N.E.2d 407 (1969).

63. E.g., People v. Olson, 46 Ill. 2d 167, 263 N.E.2d 92 (1970).

64. 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
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a murder trial the accused had been found insane. A purported
restoration proceeding later determined the accused's sanity on
a stipulation by the assistant public defender, resulting in a withdrawal of that issue from the jury. During the trial, no objection
was made to the introduction of a confession taken shortly before
the adjudication of insanity. Although supporting affidavits
were absent, the supreme court held that a hearing was required
since the record itself supported the allegations of the petition. 65
When claims are based on matters of record, as in Reeves, affidavits may supply a foundation from which the court can make
an adequate search of the record.
A greater number of post-conviction proceedings involve alleged constitutional violations based on matters not appearing of
record. Thus, for example, the knowing use of perjured testimony by the State to secure a conviction violates the defendant's
constitutional rights to a fair trial and due processs of law.66 Because direct appeal is limited to issues appearing on the face of
the record, 67 ordinarily such claims are not considered. Usually
the issue has not been presented or passed upon by the trial
court. A post-conviction proceeding is an appropriate remedy for
such a claim.68 The function of supporting affidavits in this case
is to provide the court with a preliminary indication as to how
the petitioner intends to prove his claim. Accordingly, the petition and supporting affidavits must identify with reasonable certainty the source of the evidence, its availability and its substance. 69
In People v. Agnello,70 the petitioner alleged that the State
knowingly used perjured testimony. The petition set forth a portion of a letter, purportedly received after the trial by the petitioner from a co-defendant who allegedly gave the perjured testimony. The letter contained what might be construed as an admission that a "deal" had been made between the prosecutor and
the co-defendant prior to the time the latter testified at trial.
The petition alleged further that if necessary the letter could be
obtained. Additionally, the petition made reference to an excerpt from the transcript of the trial of another alleged accomplice, suggesting that the co-defendant had been "offered consideration" in return for his testimony. The court held the petition
was adequately supported to require an evidentiary hearing.
Conversely, where the allegation is made that the State
65. Id. at 560, 107 N.E.2d at 866.
66. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
67. CALLAGHAN'S, Ill. Crim. Proc. § 40.04 (1971).
68. See People v. Hoskins, 25 Ill. 2d 333, 185 N.E.2d 214 (1962).
69. People v. Farnsley, 53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (1973); People
v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 216 N.E.2d 126 (1966).
70. 35 Ill. 2d 611, 221 N.E.2d 658 (1966).
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knowingly used perjured testimony, a petition framed in general
terms and lacking support is subject to a motion to dismiss with71
out a hearing.
To expect a petitioner to acquire supporting affidavits in
every case would be unreasonable. If, for example, the claim is
presented that a guilty plea was induced by a prosecutor's unfulfilled promise of leniency, 72 supporting this allegation may prove
difficult. There may not be many third parties with relevant
knowledge willing to produce affidavits. In cases of this type,
73
the petition must explain the absence of supporting affidavits.
It is not enough to state that oral testimony of other witnesses
is needed to sustain the allegations of the petition.7 4 The cases
of People v. Washington75 and People v. Williams 76 clarify the
nature of the explanation required.
In Washington, the petitioner alleged that while his sister
was present, his attorney had advised him of participating in
discussions with the prosecutor and the trial judge concerning
the case, and of reaching an agreement with them. In return
for a plea of guilty, the petitioner was to be sentenced to fourteen
years. The petitioner alleged that in reliance upon this promise
he pleaded guilty. The petitioner was given a twenty-five year
sentence. Other allegations charged coercive methods in obtaining a confession. The petitioner did not submit affidavits from
either the attorney or his sister. He alleged that his incarceration and indigence prevented him from obtaining these affidavits,
but that the testimony of his attorney, his sister and the police
officers who beat him would support the allegations.
With respect to the petitioner's failure to secure supporting
affidavits, the court found that the petition had adequately
"stated why affidavits were not attached," and had "identified
every person involved by name . . . . 77 The court held that a
hearing was required since the allegations of the petition were
"undisputed."78
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Underwood considered
the petitioner's explanation for his failure to obtain supporting
affidavits to be insufficient. He pointed to the petitioner's ability
to draft his own affidavit and the petitioner's allegation that his
71. E.g., People v. Wallace, 35 Ill. 2d 620, 221 N.E.2d 655 (1966).
72. A prosecutor's unfulfilled promise of a reduced sentence, or a
misrepresentation by the trial judge of the sentence to be imposed, invalidates a plea of guilty. Machribroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487
(1962).

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-2 (1973).

E.g., People v. Reed, 36 Ill. 2d 358, 223 N.E.2d 103 (1967).
38 Ill. 2d 446, 232 N.E.2d 738 (1967).
47 Ill. 2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 697 (1970).
38 Ill. 2d 446, 449, 232 N.E.2d 738, 739 (1967).
Id. at 451, 232 N.E.2d at 740.

19741

Post-Conviction Hearing Act

sister had visited him in prison the week before the petition was
drafted. In view of these factors, the dissent found the petitioner's explanation inadequate. As for the purpose of the statutory
requirement concerning affidavits, the opinion reasoned:
This requirement was obviously intended by the legislature to
limit plenary hearings in post-conviction matters to those instances in which defendant [sic] had filed with their petitions
such supporting material as was reasonably availableto them.79
In light of the difficulty in obtaining supporting affidavits
when a petition alleges an unfulfilled promise of leniency, the
reasoning of the dissent offers a more persuasive rationale for
the decision reached by the majority. The opinion implies that
the statutory requirement of affidavits is satisfied if the circumstances of a particular case indicate that supporting materials are
not reasonably available to the petitioner.
The case of People v. Williams ° provided a factual setting
resembling that posed in Washington. In Williams, the petitioner
also alleged that he was induced to plead guilty in reliance upon
his attorney's representation of leniency; the State had allegedly
agreed to a sentence ranging from six months to one year, instead
of forty to eighty years, if the petitioner went to trial. The petition further alleged that after a sentence of three to seven years
was imposed, the petitioner's attorney whispered to him that the
court would call him back and reduce the sentence to one year.
No supporting affidavits were attached to the petition. The
State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that not only had the
petitioner failed to supply affidavits, but he had also provided
no reasons for their absence.
The court distinguished Washington in only one respect-in
Washington the petitioner attempted to explain the absence of
affidavits. Otherwise, the facts were "almost identical."'
The
court held that a hearing was required, since the allegations of
the petition were neither denied by the State, nor contradicted
by the record. With respect to the requirement of affidavits, the
court unintentionally echoed the remarks of Mr. Justice Underwood, when it said:
[T]he only affidavit that petitioner could possibly have furnished, other than his own sworn statement, would have been
that of his attorney who allegedly made the misrepresentation
to him. The difficulty82or impossibility of obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent.
It would seem that when a particular affidavit is not "rea79. Id. at 453, 232 N.E.2d at 742 (emphasis added).
80. 47 Ill. 2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 697 (1970).
81. Id. at 3, 264 N.E.2d at 698.
82. Id. at 4, 264 N.E.2d at 698 (emphasis added); accord, People v.
Nesbitt, 5 Ill. App. 3d 123, 283 N.E.2d 294 (1972).
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sonably
sible to
without
may be
can also

available" to the petitioner, it is also difficult or imposobtain. No hard and fast rules, however, can be stated
reference to the specific allegations of a petition. There
other circumstances in which the rationale of Williams
be applied.
83
The Amended Petition

Because most post-conviction petitions are filed pro se by
prisoners who have not had the assistance of counsel, the Act pro4
vides for the appointment of counsel for indigent petitioners .
Supreme Court Rule 651 anticipates that appointed counsel will
probably amend the petition. 85 If the petitioner requests appointment of counsel, the court must either make such an appointment or specifically find that he does not lack sufficient
means to obtain counsel.8 6
As previously indicated, the post-conviction proceeding is
civil in nature,87 but it is not governed by the Civil Practice
Act.8 8 Section 122-5 of the Act provides, however, that with respect to amendments of petitions or any other pleading, or pleading over, or filing other pleadings, or extending the time for
pleadings, the court may make any order as it deems "appropriate, just and reasonable and as generally provided in civil
cases."8 9
Allegations contained in the pro se petition which are omitted from the amended petition will not be considered by the
court.9 0

Thus, appointed

counsel must

carefully draft the

amended petition to incorporate all claims raised 'by the pro se
pleader. Some attorneys have attempted to avoid this difficulty
by filing a supplemental petition.9 1
Under the Civil Practice Act, a supplemental pleading may
set up matters which arise after the original pleading has been
83. The discussion on petitions also applies, of course, to the amended

petition.

84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1973). See also People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 651 (1973). See Appellate Practice infra.
86. E.g., People v. Butler, 40 Ill. 2d 386, 240 N.E.2d 592 (1968).
87. Cases cited note 9 supra.
88. People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-5 (1973). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, § 46 (1973). Section 122-5 also provides for the withdrawal of petitions. The significance of this provision lies in the res judicata effects
of a final judgment under the Act. See Res Judicataand Waiver infra.
90. E.g., People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 280 N.E.2d 203 (1972); People
v. Wilson, 13 Ill. App. 3d 675, 300 N.E.2d 576 (1973).

91. In People v. Brock, 45 Ill. 2d 292, 259 N.E.2d 12 (1970), the original petition concerned a confession while the supplemental petition alleged the State's failure to perform an agreement upon which a guilty
plea was based. Both petitions were considered on the merits. Accord,
People v. Lee, 5 Ill. App. 3d 421, 283 N.E.2d 740 (1972).
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filed. 92 It may not include matters of which the pleader was unaware at the time he filed his original pleading. Such matters
should be raised by amendment. 98
Since the post-conviction proceeding is directed toward securing relief from an existing conviction, a supplemental pleading would seem improper. The facts giving rise to the claim generally have occurred before the petition is filed. Factual matter
discovered after the pro se petition is filed can be brought in by
amendment. No case law appears on this question. Whether this
procedure may be utilized depends upon the discretion of the
judge.
In drafting the amended petition, one other consideration
should be mentioned: the practice of incorporating the petition
by reference should be avoided. If an amended pleading in a civil
case relates to an original pleading, whether by reference or
94
adoption, the original pleading remains a part of the record.
Although this rule of civil pleading can arguably be applied to
a post-conviction proceeding, no reported decision has considered
the matter. Because of the opinions holding that the post-conviction proceeding is not governed by the Civil Practice Act,9" the
prudent course is to restate the allegations of the pro se petition
in their entirety in the amended petition, with appropriate modifications to compensate for the petitioner's lack of legal skills.
The Motion to Dismiss and the Answer
An evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not
always necessary since a motion to dismiss may be granted to
the State on the basis of the petition or amended petition read
in conjunction with the transcript of the trial. 96 Thus, if the allegations of the petition are refuted by the record, the motion to
97
dismiss will be granted.
Section 122-5 of the Act provides that the State must file
either an answer or a motion to dismiss within thirty days after
the filing and docketing of the petition, or within such further
time as the court allows. 98 The statute does not, however, indi92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 39 (1973). See Kovac v. Kovac, where
the court indicated that a supplemental pleading has, in some degree, the

effect of an original pleading. 26 Ill. App. 2d 29, 51, 167 N.E.2d 281, 291
(1960), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962).
93. NICHOLS, Illinois Civil Practice § 1383 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
NICHOLS].

94. Id. § 1374.

95. People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967).

96. E.g., People v. Stephany, 46 IlM.2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970); People v. Slicker, 42 Ill. 2d 307, 247 N.E.2d 407 (1969).
97. E.g., People v. Brooks, 44 Ill. 2d 35, 253 N.E.2d 381 (1969).
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-5 (1973). But cf. People v. Farnsley,
53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (1973) (no error when State's answer was
considered even though filed beyond the time provided in Section 122-5).
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cate whether the motion may be supported by affidavits containing affirmative matter not alleged in the petition. The question
has not produced a clear answer from the courts.
Although the Civil Practice Act is not applicable to a post-conviction proceeding, it may be useful to consider its rules by
way of analogy. Under the Civil Practice Act, a Section 45 motion attacks the pleading to which it is directed, on the grounds
that it is substantially insufficient in law.9 9 Since the motion
raises only a question of law, 100 it may not contain any allegations of fact. Affirmative matter is raised in the answer or reply.
Under the post-conviction proceeding, the courts have stated
that a motion to dismiss assumes the truth of the allegations of
the petition and only attacks their sufficiency. 1 1 On occasion,
the State will attach exhibits or affidavits to the motion to dismiss. 10 2 No cases have directly considered the propriety of such
a practice. People v. Jennings'0 3 suggests that a petition which
properly alleges a constitutional denial, and complies with the affidavit requirement, "calls for an answer" from the State.10 4 The
decision implies that a motion to dismiss under these circumstances is inappropriate.
The case of People v. Reeves, 0 5 following along the same
line, is even more telling. There, in response to a claim of incompetent counsel, the State filed a supplemental abstract to refute
the allegations in the petition. The abstract contained a petition
for allowance of attorney's fees and indicated the preparation
made for trial, the work done at trial, and the number of interviews held with the petitioner by his appointed counsel. Since
a factual issue was created, the court held that the contents of
the abstract "should be raised by answer rather than by motion
to dismiss."' 06
Logically extended, Reeves would require the State to assert
all affirmative matter by way of defense in an answer. The consequence of such a requirement would be the dismissal of fewer
petitions at a preliminary stage and a corresponding increase in
the number of evidentiary hearings. The additional demands
placed upon the courts might entail unnecessary use of resources,
99. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 45 (1973).
100. Swift & Co. v. Dollahan, 2 Ill. App. 2d 574, 120 N.E.2d 249 (1954).
101. E.g., People v. Wilson, 39 Ill. 2d 275, 235 N.E.2d 561 (1968).
102. E.g., People v. Newell, 41 Ill. 2d 329, 243 N.E.2d 200 (1968); People v. Wilson, 40 Ill. 2d 378, 240 N.E.2d 583 (1968) (motion to dismiss
contained affirmative matter); People v. Wegner, 40 Ill. 2d 28, 237 N.E.2d
486 (1968); People v. Sigafus, 39 Ill. 2d 68, 233 N.E.2d 386 (1968).
103. 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
104. Id. at 26, 102 N.E.2d at 827; accord, People v. Evans, 412 Ill. 606,
107 N.E.2d 839 (1952).
105. 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
106. Id. at 559, 107 N.E.2d at 863.
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since many more non-meritorious petitions would be granted
hearings. It may be for this reason that some courts have implicitly accepted the propriety of raising affirmative matter in
10 7
a motion to dismiss.
Assuming that affirmative matter may properly be contained
in a motion to dismiss, it bears some semblance to a motion pursuant to Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act. 08 Section 48 furnishes a means by which a defendant may obtain summary disposition of issues of law, or of easily proved issues of fact, with
a reservation of jury trial as to disputed questions of fact.10 9 The
motion is designed to reach matters not appearing on the face
of the pleading attacked, for example, the plaintiff's complaint. 110
Thus, the defendant may raise factual matters by affidavit in
support of the motion; yet, at the same time, the defendant admits the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, for the
purpose of the motion."' In the absence of a jury demand by
the plaintiff, the court may decide the motion upon the affidavits
and evidence offered by the parties, even though a material and
disputed question of fact is raised." 2 Alternatively, the motion
may be denied without prejudice to the rights of the defendant
to assert the same matter in his answer.
The procedure described above bears some similarity to the
post-conviction proceeding. When the State files a motion to dismiss and attaches affidavits containing affirmative matter, the
court may grant the motion or deny it, allowing the State to assert the same matters by an answer. Contrary to Section 40 of
the Civil Practice Act,"' the State's answer may be a general
4
denial employing general issues."
The motion to dismiss admits the truth of the allegations in
the petition only for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner is entitled to a hearing. 15 The Act was not designed to
107. In People v. Wilson, 39 Ill. 2d 275, 277, 235 N.E.2d 561, 562 (1968),
the court said: "[The petition] was not susceptible of disposition upon a

motion to dismiss which made no reference to the record or to any other
material relevant to the charge." (emphasis added).

A close examina-

tion of this language reveals the court's view that the motion to dismiss
would not even be considered unless it made reference to affirmative
matter.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 48 (1973).
109. Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice Notes, S.H.A. ch. 110, § 48
(1971).
110. A motion under Section 48 will also reach defects appearing on
the face of the plaintiff's complaint. The motion, however, was not primarily designed for that purpose since a motion pursuant to Section 45
will reach that defect. Id.
111. E.g, Awe v. Striker, 129 Ill. App. 2d 478, 263 N.E.2d 345 (1970).
112. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 110, § 48(3) (1973).
113. Id. § 40.
114. People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967).
115. E.g., People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).

144

The John Marshall Journal of Practiceand Procedure [Vol. 8:129

permit the adjudication of constitutional claims on the plead1 16
ings.
Thus, in People v. Airmers,117 after the court had initially
denied the State's motion to dismiss, the petitioner refused to in-

troduce any evidence at the hearing in support of the petition,
arguing that he was under no obligation to do so since the motion
had admitted all the allegations. When the petitioner elected to
stand on his petition, the court granted a motion to dismiss.
The supreme court rejected the petitioner's contention that
the effect of a motion to dismiss entitled him to judgment on
the pleadings. The court stated:
[W]here the [petitioner's] claims are based upon matters outside
the record . . . it is not the intent of the act that these claims

be adjudicated on the pleadings. The function of the pleadings
in a proceeding under the act is to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a hearing. If the trial court determines that
the allegations of the petition are sufficient to require a hearing,
the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to prove his allegations.1 18

A motion to dismiss may be filed in the following instances: 1 9 whenever the petition has not been filed within the
statutory period ;120 whenever a previous post-conviction petition
has been filed; whenever a direct appeal has been taken and the
conviction affirmed; and whenever the petition is not accompanied by supporting affidavits or fails to allege a constitutional
violation, either in law or where the factual allegations do not
establish a constitutional claim. If the motion to dismiss is
denied, or the answer creates a factual issue, an evidentiary hearing will be held.
Res Judicataand Waiver
The doctrine of res judicata constitutes a significant limitation upon the right to relief in a post-conviction proceeding. The
introduction of the term reflects the civil nature of the Act. The
doctrine finds its application in Section 122-3, which states that
116. E.g., People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967).
117. 34 Ill. 2d 222, 215 N.E.2d 225 (1966).
118. Id. at 226, 215 N.E.2d at 228.

119. Gaines, The Post Conviction Hearing Act, 39 Cm. B. REc. 418
(1958); Starrs, The Post-ConvictionHearing Act-1949-1960 and Beyond,
10 DEPAUL L. REV. 397 (1961).

120. Beginning July 1, 1965, the statute of limitations for post-convic-

tion petitions was extended to twenty years. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1221 (1973). Prior to that time it was never more than five years.

The 1965 amendment does not revive any right to post-conviction
relief that has previously been barred by the statute of limitations. People v. Reed, 42 Ill. 2d 169, 246 N.E.2d 238 (1969). Any petition filed beyond the applicable statutory period must allege "facts showing that the
delay was not due to [the petitioner's] culpable negligence." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973).
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any substantial denials of constitutional rights not raised in an
original or amended petition are waived. 12 1 The Act is not intended to provide a method by which successive evidentiary hear122
ings could be obtained on claims previously adjudicated.
A misunderstanding of the application of res judicata can
have a disastrous effect upon the rights of a petitioner in a postconviction proceeding. The questions which arise include the effect of a prior direct appeal, the effect if no direct appeal was
taken or if a direct appeal is pending, and the parameters of
fundamental fairness-a doctrine invoked by the courts to temper the mechanical application of res judicata and waiver.
It must be remembered that a post-conviction proceeding is
a new and independent investigation which is neither a substitute for an appeal, nor a limited review by an intermediate appel28
late court.
A dismissal of a post-conviction petition which has become
final, is res judicata of all constitutional claims actually raised
and all claims which could have been raised, whether or not such
dismissal was appealed. 124 Alleged constitutional violations not
presented in a post-conviction petition cannot be raised in any
subsequent petition. This proposition is made explicit by Section
25
122-3 of the Act.1
Even though a post-conviction petition will generally be subject to statutory waiver when a previous petition has been dismissed on the merits, the doctrine of waiver has been relaxed
if fundamental fairness so requires. The cases of People v. Polansky126 and People v. Slaughter 27 illustrate this principle.

rn Polansky, the petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment. He subsequently filed a pro se petition alleging indigency and requesting the appointment of counsel. The post-conviction judge, without appointing counsel and
without specifically finding that the petitioner lacked sufficient
means to obtain counsel, determined that the grounds pleaded
did not merit relief and dismissed the petition. Instead of appealing this dismissal, the petitioner filed a second petition which was
dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and waiver. An appeal
predicated on the second petition followed.
The supreme court distinguished its earlier holdings in Peo121. Id. § 122-3.
122. E.g., People v. Cox, 34 Ill. 2d 66, 213 N.E.2d 524 (1966).
123. LEIGHTON, supra note 4, at 572.
124. E.g., People v. Chapman, 33 Ill. 2d 429, 211 N.E.2d 712 (1965);
People v. Holland, 33 Ill. 2d 246, 211 N.E.2d 265 (1965).
125. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-3 (1973).
126. 39 111. 2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374 (1968).

127. 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
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pie v. Chapman128 and People v. Holland, 29 both involving successive petitions, since each petitioner there had been represented
by counsel. In contrast, Polansky's petition had contained a
proper request for counsel but was dismissed without any action
taken by the trial court on this matter. The failure to appoint
counsel was thought to thwart "the legislative purpose" of the
Act and to create "due process problems . . . in attempting to
thereafter apply res judicata and waiver principles predicated
upon the original proceeding in which neither statutory nor due
process requirements were met.' 30 The court reversed, holding
that the doctrines of res judicata and waiver could not be mechanically applied where considerations of fundamental fairness
and due process were present.
In People v. Slaughter,'31 as in Polansky, the pro se petitioner alleged indigence and requested the appointment of counsel. The State filed a motion to dismiss, urging that a prior direct
appeal was res judicata to the petition. The motion was granted.
After obtaining leave to appeal this order, and after appointment
of counsel by the supreme court, the petitioner filed a new postconviction petition in the circuit court. The second petition was
dismissed on the grounds that Section 122-3 prohibited the filing
of more than one petition. This appeal was consolidated with
13 2
the appeal from the order dismissing the original petition.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplated
• . . that the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner would consult with him either by mail or in person, ascertain his alleged grievances, examine the record of the proceedings at the trial and then amend the petition that had been filed
pro se, so that it would adequately present the prisoner's con133
stitutional contentions.
With respect to the original petition and the subsequent motion to amend, the court stated that the record clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of representation afforded to the petitioner. 34 In considering the second petition, the court, citing Po128. 33 Ill. 2d 429, 211 N.E.2d 712 (1965).
129. 33 111. 2d 246, 211 N.E.2d 265 (1965).
130. 39 Ill. 2d 84, 87, 233 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1968) (citations omitted).
131. 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
132. Additionally, the petitioner appealed from an order denying motions to vacate the original petition and to file an amended petition. All
three appeals were consolidated. Id. at 282, 235 N.E.2d at 568.
133. Id. at 285, 235 N.E.2d at 569.
134. The entire report of proceedings at the hearing on the motion to
dismiss was as follows:
"THE CLERK: Daniel Slaughter.
"ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY: It's your case. We filed
a written motion. In 61-1632, the crime was murder. On Nov. 24th,
1961, there was a sentence of 14 years to the Illinois State Penitentiary. There was a Writ of Error, reported in 29-Illinois (2d) 384,
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lansky, held that Section 122-3 and the objective of finality "must
yield when fundamental fairness so requires."'u 5
The statutory doctrine of waiver embodied in Section 122-3
is to be distinguished from another application of res judicata not
explicitly mentioned in the Act. 136 Where the defendant has
taken a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, the decision of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues appearing in the record and actually decided, and all issues which could
37
have been presented to the reviewing court from the record.
This application of res judicata was read into the Act in
People v. Dale,38 in response to the argument that the Act was
invalid since it purported to allow nisi prius courts to overturn
final adjudications by the supreme court. In Dale, the court held
that constitutional issues previously adjudicated may not be reconsidered in a post-conviction proceeding. The court amplified
its holding:
The Act . . . does not provide for the means of refuting or disputing the original findings and judgment or the affirmance
thereof, but it provides for a new proceeding to afford an inquiry
into the constitutional integrity of the proceeding in which the
139
judgment was entered.
which was affirmed, and the order was entered down here on December 23rd, 1963. All of his allegations are nothing more than mere
conclusions, and we have filed a Motion to Dismiss. They are bare
allegations and the allegations affirmed are res judicata to the petition.
"ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER: Just for the record, the petitioner alleges that the entire proceedings upon which the conviction
was had were grossly illegal, wanting in law and contrary to the
Constitution of the United States in that, generally, his rights were
violated, his constitutional rights were violated.
"THE COURT: All right, motion of the respondent to dismiss
is sustained.
Id. at 280-81, 235 N.E.2d at 567.
135. Id. at 285, 235 N.E.2d at 569-70.
136. Still a third application of waiver is that a point not urged before
the trial court waives the matter for purposes of appeal, absent plain error. Failure to object at trial waives the matter both on direct appeal
and in a post-conviction proceeding.
137. E.g., People v. Adams, 52 Ill. 2d 224, 287 N.E.2d 695 (1972); People v. Collins, 39 Ill. 2d 286, 235 N.E.2d 570 (1968); People v. Cox, 34 Ill.
2d 66, 213 N.E.2d 524 (1966). This includes issues raised on appeal to
which no reference is made in the court's written opinion. See ILLINOIS
CRIMINAL PRACTICE (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education),
Library of Congress no. 7B-163192 ch 15, § 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PRACTICE], where it is suggested that a few habeas
corpus decisions in federal court have assumed otherwise, although no Illinois law supports this view. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Adams v.
Pate, 418 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Federal Habeas Corpus:
Exhaustion of Remedies infra.
138. 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950).
139. Id. at 245, 92 N.E.2d at 765. Dale has been extended to apply the
doctrine of res judicata to any post-conviction proceeding in which constitutional claims are raised, having been previously afforded direct review on appeal by either the supreme court or the appellate court. E.g.,
People v. Arnold, 45 Ill. 2d 113, 256 N.E.2d 809 (1970); People v. Bright,
42 Ill. 2d 331, 247 N.E.2d 426 (1969); People v. Kamsler, 39 Ill. 2d 73, 233
N.E.2d 415 (1968).
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Consequently, those alleged constitutional violations appearing on the face of the record which were not presented on appeal
are waived and cannot be raised in subsequent post-conviction
proceeding. 140 This result is not changed even if the post-conviction petition is filed before the reviewing court hands down its
4
opinion.' '
The doctrine of res judicata may have serious consequences,
since the appointed post-conviction counsel will often not be
handling the direct appeal. To avoid the rigors of the doctrine,
the appointed post-conviction attorney should consult with the
attorney handling the direct appeal to determine if any constitutional claims are being raised. The post-conviction petition
should then be amended to include all such claims. 142 Failure
to adopt this procedure will result in the waiver of all constitutional violations appearing on the face of the record. Here, the
application of waiver and res judicata does not rest on Section
148
122-3, but upon the principle announced in People v. Dale.
Just as the supreme court has relaxed the doctrine of waiver
where a prior post-conviction petition has been dismissed, if
fundamental fairness so requires, this exception will also be ex44
tended to cases where a direct appeal has been taken.
In the case of People v. Hamby, 45 the petitioner sued out
a writ of error to review his conviction. The record indicated
that the petitioner had disagreed with his counsel as to the issues
to be raised on review. During the pendency of the review, the
petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition. When the writ
of error was later denied, the State moved to dismiss the petition
on the grounds of res judicata. The petitioner sought review of
the order granting the State's motion.
The court's treatment of the doctrine of waiver was as follows:
140. E.g., People v. Mamolella, 42 Ill. 2d 69, 245 N.E.2d 485 (1969).
141. In People v. Walker, 6 Ill. App. 3d 909, 286 N.E.2d 812 (1972), the
court stated:
Once any issue is presented on direct appeal to a court of review, it
cannot properly be considered at a post-conviction hearing even
though at the time of the hearing the reviewing court has not passed
on the question.
Id. at 911, 286 N.E.2d at 815.

142. ILLINOlS CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 137, at ch. 15, § 4.

143. 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950)
144. See also People v. Raymond, 42 Ill. 2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663 (1969).

The burden is on the petitioner to show why the doctrine of waiver
should not be applied. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 44 Ill. 2d 299, 255 N.E.2d
377 (1970).
The doctrine of waiver has been relaxed when new constitutional
principles are held retroactive even though an appeal has previously
been taken. E.g., People v. Strader, 38 Ill. 2d 93, 230 N.E.2d 569 (1967).
This can occur when the United States Supreme Court has effected a
change in the law as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.

145. 32 Ill. 2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456 (1965).
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As to the waiver, we are constrained to disagree under the peculiar facts here presented. It is true that we have consistently
held- that where review has once been had by writ of error, including presentation of a bill of exceptions, any claims which
might have there been raised, but were not, are considered
waived. . . . We consider the waiver principle a salutary one,
conductive to the effective enforcement of the rules which society
has established for its protection, but we have not hesitated to
relax its application where fundamental fairness so requires. 146
The petitioner attempted to have his attorney raise certain issues
on review. Since the attorney apparently considered these issues
lacking in merit or unavailable on the record, the court refused
1 47
to apply res judicata.
Where an appeal of the conviction has been bypassed,
whether by inadvertence, design or indigence, errors in the trial
not of constitutional dimension cannot be raised in a subsequent
post-conviction proceeding. 148 However, in this instance, the petition can properly allege constitutional violations appearing
on the face of the record, as well as those errors beyond the record, since the failure to appeal does not invoke the doctrine of
waiver in respect to these claims.
Even though a direct appeal has been taken, waiver will not
preclude a post-conviction petition which raises constitutional
violations beyond the record. If no direct appeal has been taken,
the post-conviction remedy is broader, since the petition can also
properly allege constitutional violations appearing on the face of
the record. This does not necessarily mean that a post-conviction
petition should be filed in lieu of a direct appeal, as such a practice waives all non-constitutional errors.
Therefore, a defendant having meritorious claims both constitutional and non-constitutional in dimension will be in a better
position if the direct appeal is taken. Additionally, he will have
the option of postponing the filing of his post-conviction petition
until the appeal is decided, or of immediately filing a post-conviction petition, making sure to include in the petition all constitutional errors being urged on appeal. Thus, the attorney for a
defendant in such cases should not consider the post-conviction
petition as a substitute for the direct appeal.
The latter option contemplates the filing of the petition while
the appeal is still pending. This procedure is permissible because
the petitioner need not pursue a direct appeal to conclusion as
a condition precedent to the right to file a post-conviction peti146. Id. at 294, 205 N.E.2d at 458 (citations omitted).

147. Id.

148. E.g., People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 253 N.E.2d 456 (1969), appeal
after remand, 48 Ill. 2d 300, 268 N.E.2d 700 (1971).
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tion.1 49

If the petition is dismissed, or relief is denied after a

hearing, an appeal from this ruling may be consolidated with the
direct appeal. 150 Technically, the appellate court will consider
the two appeals separately, but the effect is to bring before the
court two separate records. The brief for the consolidated appeal
must distinguish between the two appeals. In People v. McCarroll,'51 the defendant's brief argued the issues in one appeal
interchangeably with those in the other. Although the court
considered the appeals separately, it rejected the notion that the
direct appeal and post-conviction appeal could be "indiscrim15 2
inately commingled."'
On the other hand, a defendant whose only claims are of constitutional magnitude may file a post-conviction petition and bypass the direct appeal without waiving any claims. The postconviction proceeding will adequately provide him with the opportunity to raise all alleged constitutional violations whether
they appear on 'the face of, or beyond, the record.
The post-conviction proceeding is not entirely coextensive
with a direct appeal. Although their purposes differ, under some
circumstances they may overlap to some degree, possibly requiring the use of 'both. When used together, they must be coordinated with one another for maximum efficacy; otherwise claims
may be waived. When used separately, claims available in one
may not be available in the other.
1
FederalHabeas Corpus: Exhaustion of Remedies'"

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act was designed to "bridge the
gaps" between pre-existing Illinois remedies and federal habeas
corpus. 15 4 A writ of habeas corpus may be sought on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court
if
...it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, or .. .there is either an

absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner. 155
149. Id.; People v. Blades, 7 Ill. App. 3d 748, 288 N.E.2d 701 (1972)

(Nos. 71-226 & 72-110, Unpub'd opinion).
150. In People v. Moore, 42 Ill. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), this practice was implicitly approved.
See also ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 137, at ch. 15, § 4.

151. 10 Ill. App. 3d 249, 294 N.E.2d 52 (1973).

The court cited Moore,

note 150 supra, as precedent for this practice.
152. 10 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253, 294 N.E.2d 52, 56 (1973).
153. See generally Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus: Its Uncertain
Effects on Illinois Law, 59 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 696 (1964).

154. People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); see JENNER,
supra note 4.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). Section 2254(c) provides as follows:
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Although the exhaustion provision is based on the doctrine of
abstention rather than federal jurisdiction, 156 it is usually a prerequisite to the filing of a petition. 5 7 In Fay v. Noia,158 the Supreme Court construed the exhaustion provision to refer only to
those remedies available to the applicant at the time he petitions
for federal habeas corpus, not to those remedies that might have
been available at any time.
When the petition for federal habeas corpus raises constitutional violations beyond the record, which have not been previously considered on appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding,
the federal court will dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies. 159 If, however, the petitioner's conviction has been affirmed on direct review, the question arises whether the failure
to institute post-conviction proceedings should result in a dismissal of the federal petition on the grounds that the petitioner
has not exhausted his state remedies. If the federal court dismisses, any subsequent post-conviction petition will be met by
the doctrine of res judicata.
As previously stated, alleged constitutional violations appearing on the face of the record which were not presented on
appeal are waived and cannot be raised in the post-conviction
proceeding. Unless considerations of fundamental fairness are
present and the petitioner can fit within the exception announced
in People v. Hamby, the post-conviction petition will be disAn applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.
The exhaustion provisions were codifications of judicially developed doctrines. See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
156. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

157. But see United States ex rel. Durso v. Pate, 426 F.2d 1083 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 995 (1971), aff'g 299 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.
Il1. 1969). In Durso, although the federal district court thought that the
petitioner had failed to exhaust his remedies, it considered his claims on

the merits. An examination of the prior direct appeal reveals that this

belief may have been erroneous. 40 Ill. 2d 242, 239 N.E.2d 842 (1968),

cert. denied, 372 U.S. 1111 (1969).
158. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
159. E.g., United States ex rel. Wax v. Twomey, 465 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.
1972) (suppression of psychiatric reports at trial); United States ex rel.
Waldron v. Pate, 380 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054
(1968) (disqualification of jurors); United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Pate,
341 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 945. Although the pe-

tition in Calhoun was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state
remedies, the court erroneously assumed that state habeas corpus would
reach the allegation that the prosecution had knowingly used perjured
testimony. In Illinois, habeas corpus is not available to assert non-jurisdictional constitutional claims. Notes 20-24 supra & accompanying text.
The court also failed to mention the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
the appropriate remedy for such a claim. Notes 66-68 supra & accompanying text.
When no appeal is taken, the exhaustion provision requires that a
post-conviction petition be filed. E.g., United States ex rel. Green v.
Pate, 411 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1969).
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missed. 60° Although this judgment may be appealed, it will
likely be affirmed. The net result is that the petitioner, having
exhausted his state remedies, can once again enter federal court
requesting habeas corpus.
Where the conviction has been affirmed on direct review, but
there has been no post-conviction proceeding, the federal court
is faced with a serious dilemma. When ruling on the petition
for habeas corpus, the court may consider the petitioner's claims
on the merits by holding that the waiver doctrine renders the
post-conviction proceeding an ineffective state remedy; alternatively, the court can hold that the petitioner has failed to exhaust
his state remedies on the grounds that fundamental fairness may
provide the Illinois courts with an opportunity to consider constitutional violations not presented on the direct appeal.
The federal courts are reluctant to choose the first option because the doctrine of abstention embodies a policy of providing
the states with the first opportunity to rule upon constitutional
claims of state prisoners. By choosing the latter option, however,
the federal court will force the petitioner to return to the state
courts, where his post-conviction petition faces the likely prospect of dismissal on the grounds of res judicata. The federal
courts have not yet provided a clear answer to this problem.
In United States ex rel. Millner v. Pate,'61 the petitioner
sought federal habeas corpus after the Supreme Court of Illinois
had denied, without opinion, an untimely motion for leave to appeal from a decision affirming his conviction. The petitioner contended that the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act was not a
meaningful state remedy. The claims urged in federal court
were not raised on his prior appeal and would therefore be considered waived. 6 2 The seventh circuit refused to assume that
the Illinois courts would apply the waiver doctrine. The court
pointed to the petitioner's claim of disagreement with counsel
concerning the issues to be raised on appeal. Apparently this factor permitted the court to find analogous circumstances to those
which had led the Supreme Court of Illinois to relax the doctrine
of waiver in Hamby. As in Hamby, the court implied that petitioner's claim of disagreement could be presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois if a post-conviction petition were denied.
Consequently, the habeas corpus petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. 16 3
160. Notes 144-47 supra & accompanying text.
161. 425 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1970).
162. In his petition for federal habeas corpus, the petitioner claimed

error in the admission of a statement violating his Fifth Amendment

right.
163. Millner was relied upon in United States ex rel. Little v. Twomey,
477 F.2d 767, 774-75 (7th Cir. 1973). In that case the petitioner alleged
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In United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 6 4 although the
court of appeals affirmed a dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpus, the question raised in Millner was again presented.165
The result in Allum, though dicta, was completely different. Unlike Millner, Allum had failed to object at the trial to the admission into evidence of certain in-custody statements. 66 Apparently, the Illinois appellate court did not consider this claim, since
the issue had not been properly preserved for review.
The petitioner sought federal habeas corpus, contending that
the exhaustion provision was inapplicable because no state remedy was available. Upon examination of the trial record, the
court of appeals concluded that the petitioner had been competently represented by retained counsel. Furthermore, the petitioner did not dispute this finding. Without explicitly stating
whether the outcome depended upon these factors, the court implied that it was influenced by them to some degree. The court
stated:
[W]e agree with petitioner that this [fundamental fairness] exception has only been applied in fairly clear-cut situations, none
of which fits this case. Second, even if a broader and more subjective test of fundamental fairness is applicable, our own appraisal of the record leads us rather confidently to the conclusion
that there is nothing fundamentally unfair in the application
of
6 7
the waiver rule to the issue petitioner seeks to raise.'
Recognizing that a series of futile proceedings would ensue if the
exhaustion provision were found applicable, the court proceeded
to determine whether the petitioner had waived the federal claim
6
by failing to raise the issue in state court.
If Allum had been sent back to the Illinois courts to seek
a post-conviction proceeding, he would have been in substantially
the same position as Millner, even though Allum had failed to
object at trial. Since 'both cases involved claims appearing of record, the post-conviction petitions would in all likelihood face dismissal on the grounds of res judicata (in the absence of fundamental fairness).
"the indifference and hostility of appellate counsel" as one of the grounds
in support of his petition for habeas corpus.
164. 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973).
165. Relief was denied because the petitioner had deliberately bypassed state procedural requirements. A failure to raise federal claims
in the state courts, "whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons
that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures," allows the federal courts to deny relief even if the federal claims
were not considered on the merits in the state court. Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
166. In the petition for habeas corpus, it was argued that these in-custody statements were improperly admitted under the rule of Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
167. 484 F.2d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 1973).
168. Note 165 supra.
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The solution offered in Millner implies that the federal
courts may infer the presence of fundamental fairness if the petitioner raises the issue in his petition for habeas corpus. A petitioner can gamble by choosing not to make this allegation, provided he has other meritorious claims properly preserved in the
record which were not previously raised on appeal. Like Allum,
he can then argue that he is left without an adequate state remedy since no exception to the waiver rule is applicable. 169
The solution provided in Allum presents even greater complexities for the federal court. Allum implies that the court
should search the record to determine whether the doctrine of
waiver is applicable. If this process reveals that fundamental
fairness might provide the Illinois courts with an opportunity to
consider previously "waived" issues, then the petition for habeas
corpus should be dismissed. But, in examining the record to determine whether it should exercise jurisdiction, the court will
necessarily consider issues bearing on the merits. A dismissal for
failure to exhaust remedies implies that fundamental fairness
may be present. While such a determination is not binding, this
entire process utilizes circuitous methods to answer a crucial
question-whether the petitioner has available an effective state
remedy.
Judicial economy might be better served if the court resolved
the case on the merits without determining whether fundamental
fairness was present, rather than examining the record to decide
whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction. It is significant that People v. Hamby represents an exception of limited application designed by the Supreme Court of Illinois to promote
the purposes of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Since it is not
frequently invoked by the Illinois courts, its use in the federal
courts may produce results which Hamby was designed to avoid.
The reasoning of Judge Will in United States ex rel. Gates
v. Twomey,170 though concerned with a more limited question
than that posed in Millner and Allum, merits consideration. In
Gates, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District had affirmed the petitioner's conviction. After the Supreme Court of
Illinois denied leave to appeal, the petitioner sought federal habeas corpus, raising the same issues urged on his direct appeal.
The court stated the question:
Because [the petitioner] has failed to [file a post-conviction petition] this omission must be deemed a failure to exhaust his state
169. If the petitioner has many claims which were not previously
raised on appeal, the federal court might find that this factor alone implies the presence of fundamental fairness.
170. 325 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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remedies if, but only if, he could now raise those contentions
which he urges herein in the post-conviction hearing.17'

Recognizing that the Supreme Court of Illinois had relaxed the
doctrine of waiver with respect to issues actually raised and decided on appeal in only one instance, Judge Will concluded that
it was "unlikely that the Illinois courts would not apply the doctrine of res judicata."'1 72 Accordingly, the court held that the petitioner did not have an effective state court remedy, and pro178
ceeded to the merits.
Gates is distinguishable from Millner and Allum, since in
those cases the petition for habeas corpus raised claims not decided upon by the Illinois courts. Nonetheless, the rationale of
Gates may be applicable. Absent the unusual circumstances
present in Millner, Gates recognized that it is unnecessary for
a petitioner to "show that precisely those points raised in the federal court were previously raised in the state courts or may no
74
longer there be raised.'
Where a direct appeal has been taken, the Illinois courts apply the waiver doctrine nearly as often to issues actually raised
and decided as to issues which could have been presented. For
the federal courts to consider the doctrine of fundamental fairness as being broader in one case than in the other is to determine
a question not yet resolved by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Discovery

One problem which recurs in the administration of post-conviction petitions is the inability of appointed counsel to reliably
evaluate the precise factual basis of a pro se petition, even though
the petition is apparently grounded on a substantial claim. The
filing of an inordinate number of petitions only compounds this
difficulty. The Supreme Court of Illinois has indicated that the
function of the post-conviction proceeding is not satisfied unless
the appointed attorney "ascertains the basis of [the petitioner's]
complaints, shapes those complaints into appropriate legal form
and presents them to the court."'' 75
One method of ascertaining the basis of the petition is
171. Id. at 921.
172. Id. at 925. In People v. Keagle, 37 Ill. 2d 96, 224 N.E.2d 834
(1967), the Supreme Court of Illinois had ruled upon a claim on direct
appeal; subsequently, the court considered the same issue in reviewing
the dismissal of a post-conviction petition. The claim, however, was
"highly technical" and "unrelated to guilt or innocence." Id. at 101, 224
N.E.2d at 837.
173. See Coley v. Alvis, 381 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1967) (Ohio law).
174. 325 F. Supp. 920, 921 (N.D. Ill. 1971). See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Gonzales v. Follette, 414 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1969); Cotner v. Henry,
394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (Indiana law). See
special note at p. 166 infra.
175. People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278, 285, 235 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1968).
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through the discovery process. The use of discovery procedures,
even if limited in scope, could assist the appointed attorney in
ferreting out the unsubstantial petitions, as well as providing
the evidentiary basis for those meritorious claims which require
further attention.
Since the Civil Practice Act does not govern proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, it would seem that civil discovery rules are inapplicable. No direct treatment of discovery
is found, however, either in a statute or court rule, except for
the reference in Section 122-6 of the Act that "the court may receive proof by ... depositions.' 1 76 Although this section implies
the existence of at least a limited discovery process, it is unclear
whether it contemplates the use of civil or criminal discovery
rules, and whether it impliedly excludes the application of civil
discovery procedures other than depositions. The first case to
77
construe this section was People v. Rose.
In Rose, the supreme court had granted the petitioners a
hearing, and directed that a different judge preside at the postconviction proceeding because of the possibility that the trial
judge would be called as a witness.178 In an attempt to discover
whether the judge had received evidence off the record at the
trial, the petitioners served the trial judge, the assistant State's
Attorney and the bailiff with notices to appear for discovery depositions. When none appeared, the petitioners moved for "relief
pursuant to Rule 219" to order their appearance. The postconviction judge refused to make such an order. The witnesses
testified at the hearing and were subject to cross-examination.
On appeal, the petitioners, citing Section 122-6, contended
that since the post-conviction proceeding is civil in nature, the
civil discovery rules apply, and the judge should have ordered
the witnesses to appear. Further, the petitioners argued that the
testimony of the trial judge should have been excluded. 79 The
supreme court disagreed:
In our opinion section 6 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
contemplates the use of evidence depositions and does not refer
to discovery depositions. As with many orders for discovery and
the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply therewith, the
trial court's refusal to order the witnesses to appear for deposi176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1973).
177. 48 Ill. 2d 300, 268 N.E.2d 700 (1971).
178. The prior appeal can be found at 43 Ill. 2d 273, 253 N.E.2d 456
(1969).
179. The petitioners apparently sought to invoke Supreme Court Rule
219 (c) (iv). The rule provides that a witness may be barred from testifying, if a party, or any person at the instance of or in collusion with
a party, unreasonably refuses to comply with any discovery procedures
or any court order entered pursuant thereto. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
§ 219(c) (iv) (1973).
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tion was an exercise of the court's discretionary powers and its
decision should not be reversed unless there has been an abuse
of discretion. The witnesses appeared, testified and were crossexamined at length. Under the circumstances shown in this record, the refusal to order the witnesses to appear for deposition
was not an abuse of discretion. 180
The decision does not indicate whether any other discovery
procedures, civil or criminal, apply to post-conviction proceedings. Further, it is unclear whether criminal Rule 414181 or civil
Rule 212(b) 182 is to guide the post-conviction judge in determining whether to issue an order compelling an appearance for an
evidence deposition. The requirements differ under Rules 414

and 212 (b). 183
The opinion in Rose implies that a post-conviction judge has
discretion to permit discovery. Although the scope of discovery
is not clearly defined, an appropriate court rule could remedy
the situation.
Presence of Petitionerat Hearing
Though the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 184 guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to
be present at his own trial, the rights of a petitioner under a postconviction proceeding are derived from the statute, and no such
guarantee applies. Section 122-6 provides that the court may, in
its discretion, "order the petitioner brought before the court for
the hearing."' 8 5
The right, however, is not absolute. The petitioner has no
right to be present at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, since
it merely involves the pleadings and the sufficiency of the petition, and no evidence is presented. 186 The courts have recognized
the risks and expenses which arise in transporting prisoners to
courtrooms.
If an evidentiary hearing is granted in which a factual issue
must be resolved, the petitioner's presence at the hearing may,
in some instances, be necessary. 8 7 Again, the right is not absolute, and no determination will be disturbed on appeal unless
180. 48 Ill. 2d 300, 302, 268 N.E.2d 700, 701 (1971).
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 414 (1973).
182. Id. § 212(b).
183. Under Rule 414, it must appear to the court that the deposition
"is necessary for the preservation of relevant testimony because of the
substantial possibility it would be unavailable at the time of hearing or
trial." Id. § 414. These requirements are much stricter than those in
Rule 212(b), which permits evidence depositions when specified degrees
of unavailability are shown. Id. § 212(b).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1973).
186. E.g., People v. Wilson, 40 Ill. 2d 378, 240 N.E.2d 583 (1968); People
v. Hamby, 39 Ill. 2d 290, 235 N.E.2d 572 (1968).
187. E.g., People v. Adams, 4 Ill. 2d 453, 123 N.E.2d 327 (1954).

158

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 8:129

there is a clear showing of prejudice,'8 8 or an abuse of discretion.8 9
Where the petitioner's presence is desired by counsel to assist
in presenting the case, a request or showing establishing the necessity for such presence must be made. 190 In People v. Cummins,' 9 1 the petitioner alleged that the State's Attorney induced
him to forego his right to counsel, either by promises or misrepresentation. The State's Attorney testified orally at the hearing
and was subject to cross-examination. The petitioner was not
present. It was held to be no abuse of discretion for the hearing
judge to accept the petitioner's affidavit instead of his oral testimony, since "no request or showing was made that [his] presence
would be necessary.' 1 92 Even if a proper request or showing is
made, a motion to bring the petitioner before the court for the
hearing may be denied where his testimony would not change
the result. 9 3
Motion for Substitution of Judges
Proper venue in a post-conviction proceeding lies in the court
in which the conviction took place.19 4 Efficiency of judicial administration favors this approach. The creation of a factual issue
is more readily resolved in the court where the original prosecution occurred because the witnesses and the record are accessible. 195
In a criminal case, the defendant has an absolute right to
substitution of judges, if he makes a proper request, verified or
accompanied by affidavit, within ten days after he learns that
his case has been assigned to a specific judge. 19 No such right
exists in a post-conviction proceeding, even though the judgment
towards which the remedy is directed was entered in a criminal
case.
188. E.g., People v. Smith, 42 Ill. 2d 547, 248 N.E.2d 85 (1969).
189. E.g., People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 216 N.E.2d 126 (1966).
190. People v. Cummins, 414 Ill. 308, 111 N.E.2d 307 (1953).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 311, 111 N.E.2d at 309.
193. People v. Adams, 4 Ill. 2d 453, 123 N.E.2d 327 (1954).
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973).
195. On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, venue is proper in the
court at the place of imprisonment or restraint, or in the court where the
conviction occurred. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, § 2 (1973). Since a post-conviction proceeding may be instituted only in the court in which the conviction took place, the burden of these petitions does not fall entirely on
the courts handling habeas corpus proceedings.
196. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-5(a) (1973); People v. Etheridge, 78
Ill. App. 2d 299, 223 N.E.2d 437 (1966). If a proper request is made beyond the ten-day period, the ruling is subject to the discretion of the trial
court, but the defendant is entitled to a hearing on the motion. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 114-5(c) (1973).
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 146, § 1
(change of venue in civil cases); § 18 (change of venue in contempt
proceedings) (1973).
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In People v. Mamolella,197 the Supreme Court of Illinois,
without referring to the venue provision of Section 122-1 of the
Act, stated:
[W]e find no error in the denial of defendant's petition for a
change of venue in this proceeding. In the absence of a showing
that defendant would be substantially prejudiced, the postconviction petition should be heard by the same judge who rendered the original judgment.' 9 8
When the post-conviction judge may be biased or may be
called as a witness since he has knowledge not appearing in the
record, the judge should recuse himself and the proceeding
should be assigned to another judge. 99
The original trial judge is probably more familiar with the
case, thus providing an expeditious resolution of the matter. The
element of time may, however, dim his recollection. Some may
contend that the rule places the judge in substantially the same
position as if a motion for a new trial were presented to him.
According to this view, no prejudice results in requiring the same
judge to consider the post-conviction petition, since he is merely
being given the opportunity to correct previous errors. Furthermore, a procedure which allows frequent substitution of judges
would operate to frustrate the purposes of the post-conviction
proceeding, since a judge would find it more difficult to evaluate
prior rulings of a colleague on the bench than to reconsider his
own.

On the other hand, the integrity of a post-conviction proceeding may be seriously compromised by permitting the original
judge to preside. He is not unfamiliar with the background of
the case, nor is he unaware of prior occurrences. More important
is the fact that the post-conviction proceeding is a "new and independent investigation, ' 20 0 which was designged to afford a complete remedy to those claiming constitutional denials. The 'broad
discretion placed in the post-conviction judge on matters of fact
and law should be balanced by a less restrictive policy on reas01
signment. 2
The Hearing and the Proof
If the motion to dismiss is denied, or the answer creates a
factual issue, an evidentiary hearing will be held. 20 2 Section 122197. 42 Ill. 2d 69, 245 N.E.2d 485 (1969).
198. Id. at 73, 245 N.E.2d at 487. For this proposition the court cited
People v. Sheppard, 405 Ill. 79, 90 N.E.2d 78 (1950), a case involving the
writ of coram nobis.
199. E.g., People v. Wilson, 37 Ill. 2d 617, 230 N.E.2d 194 (1967).
200. LEIGHTON, supra note 4, at 572.
201. ABA

STANDARDS

RELATING TO POST-CoNvIcTioN

Commentary (Tent. Draft 1967).
202. See The Motion to Dismiss and the Answer supra.

REMEDIES
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6 refers only indirectly to the subject of hearings. 20 3 No mention
is made of the rules by which the hearing is to be governed.
Since the post-conviction proceeding has been characterized
as civil in nature, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the
allegations of his petition 2 4 by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 5 As in other cases tried by the court without a jury,
the credibility and weight of the evidence is for the trial judge
to determine. 20 6 Reviewing courts have often stated that unless
his determination is shown to be "manifestly erroneous," it will
20 7
be affirmed.
In People v. Bracey, 20 the Supreme Court of Illinois relaxed
the burden of proof required of the petitioner when his claim
rests on perjured testimony. Prior to Bracey, the petitioner had
to establish that the perjured testimony was so material to the
issue tried as to have probably controlled the result.20 9 Because
this 'burden was not entirely consonant with the federal "harmless-error" rule, announced in Chapman v. California,210 the
court reallocated the burden of proof as follows:
Once the condemned use of perjured testimony has been established, Chapman [dictates] that the burden then be placed on
the perthe State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
211
jured testimony did not contribute to the conviction.
In addition to the burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the allegations made in the petition are true, the petitioner also
has the burden of producing evidence. Thus, the petitioner cannot elect to stand on his petition, even though it has been found
203. The statute provides in relevant part: "In its discretion the court
may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing." ILL.
REV. STAT.ch. 38, § 122-6 (1973).
204. E.g., People v. Bracey, 51 Ill. 2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1972).
205. E.g., People v. Wease,44 Ill. 2d 453, 255 N.E.2d 426 (1970). But
see People v. Somerville, 42 Ill. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 461 (1969) (clear and
convincing evidence); People v. Logue, 45 Ill. 2d 170, 258 N.E.2d 323
(1970) (clear demonstration).
206. E.g., People v. Wease, 44 Ill. 2d 453, 255 N.E.2d 426 (1970) (credibility of witnesses); People v. Anderson, 5 Ill. App. 3d 838, 284 N.E.2d
51 (1972) (weight of testimony).
207. E.g., People v. Bracey, 51 Ill. 2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1972). Cf.
People v. Thomas, 20 Ill. 2d 603, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 887 (1961). In Thomas, minor variances in testimony at the hearing
from that given at the trial were explained by the lapse of time.
208. 51 Ill. 2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1972).
209. E.g., People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d 520, 221 N.E.2d 499 (1966); People v. Lewis, 22 Ill. 2d 68, 174 N.E.2d 197 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
876. Ostrand and Lewis were explicitly overruled by Bracey.
210. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In the circumstances of a particular case, not
all constitutional errors are prejudicial requiring reversal. Some errors
may be deemed harmless. But the court must be able to declare a belief
that "it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. In
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), the rule stated would achieve
the same result: "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Id. at 86-87.
211. 51 Ill. 2d 514, 520, 283 N.E.2d 685, 690 (1972).
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legally sufficient to require a hearing. 212 If the petitioner either
fails or refuses to produce evidence in support of his claims, the
petition will be denied, 21- since the petitioner has not sustained

his burden of going forward with the evidence.
When the State denies the allegations of the petition, or
pleads an affirmative defense, the question arises whether the
burden of producing evidence ever shifts to the State. In People
v. La Frana,214 the petition alleged a coerced confession. At the
hearing it was undisputed that the petitioner's wife and his attorney were not permitted to see him until after he had signed a
confession. The petitioner's testimony as to his physical condition after the confession was corroborated by his wife and his
attorney. In addition, photographs of the petitioner, records of
the county jail, and the testimony of the county physician led
the court to say:
But where it is conceded, or clearly established, that the defendant received injuries while in police custody, and the only issue
is how and why they were inflicted, we have held that something
more than a mere denial by the police of coercion is required.
Under such circumstances the burden of establishing that the injuries were not administered in order to obtain the confession,
can be met only by clear and convincing testimony as to the
manner of their occurrence ...
The testimony on behalf of the [State] falls short, in our
opinion, of meeting the burden which rested upon it. 215
This decision implied that unless the evidence produced by the
petitioner is conceded by the State or clearly established, the burden does not shift to the State.
Section 122-6 of the Act grants to the post-conviction judge
broad discretion as to the type of evidence he may receive at the
hearing. 216 The court may receive proof by testimonial evidence,
affidavit, depositions, 217 or other evidence which may support the
petition. 218 Thus, evidence lacking probative value may be excluded.21 9 The court may admit evidence which bears on the petitioner's credibility, 220 or find that a privilege has been
waived. 221 It is within the sound discretion of the court to de212. People v. Airmers, 34 Ill. 2d 222, 215 N.E.2d 225 (1966).

213. Id.
214. 4 Ill. 2d 261, 122 N.E.2d 583 (1954).

215. Id. at 267-68, 122 N.E.2d at 586.
216. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1973).

217. See Discovery supra.
218. People v. Jenkins, 12 Ill. App. 3d 833, 299 N.E.2d 155 (1973)
56870, Unpub'd opinion).

(No.

219. E.g., People v. Ponder, 10 Ill. App. 3d 613, 295 N.E.2d 104 (1973);
People v. Mims, 10 Ill. App. 3d 147, 294 N.E.2d 71 (1973).
220. E.g., People v. Wilson, 13 Ill. App. 3d 675, 300 N.E.2d 576 (1973).
221. E.g., People v. Peaslee, 7 Ill. App. 3d 312, 287 N.E.2d 309 (1972)
(No. 71-381, Unpub'd opinion).
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termine whether a witness who has violated an exclusion order
should be permitted to testify. 222 The record of the original trial
or any relevant excerpts from the transcript may be considered. 223 The judge need not read the original transcript, at least
224
where the decision would be the same if he had done SO.
The petitioner's presence at the hearing may be ordered, but,
as previously indicated, this matter is discretionary. 225
Thus,
factual issues may be tried upon affidavits in lieu of oral testimony, even if the effect is to preclude the petitioner from testifying in his own behalf. 226 If the petitioner offers false testimony at the hearing, the court has the inherent power to hold
him in contempt for obstructing or interfering with the adminis227
tration of justice.
The Act does not require the judge to enter special findings
of fact and conclusions of law. 228 In People v. Hamby, the court
was unable to determine from the record why the trial judge had
dismissed the amended petition. The court observed:
The ambiguity here existing demonstrates the desirability of incorporating a brief statement of the trial court's findings or reasons therefore [sic] into the written order or oral pronounce229

ment of a ruling.

Owing to the fact that this practice has not been regularly followed, 230 the need for an appropriate court rule is apparent.
Any such rule should apply in all cases of dismissal whether or
not a hearing is granted. The purpose of requiring special findings is to provide the appellate courts with a basis upon which
an adequate review can be made. This rationale applies whether
222. E.g., People v. Gibson, 42 Ill. 2d 519, 248 N.E.2d 108 (1969).
223. E.g., People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 110 N.E.2d 249 (1953).
224. E.g., People v. Thomas, 20 Ill. 2d 603, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 887 (1961).
225. Notes 184-93 supra & accompanying text.
226. E.g., People v. Cummins, 414 IlI. 308, 111 N.E.2d 307 (1953).
Notes 190-92 supra & accompanying text.
227. People v. Bennett, 51 Ill. 2d 282, 281 N.E.2d 664 (1972). The petitioner who gives false testimony at the hearing may also be prosecuted
for perjury. See, e.g., People v. Harper, 43 Ill. 2d 368, 375, 253 N.E.2d
451, 454 (1969). The attorney has a duty to warn his client of the possible consequences of a false allegation in a petition. People v. Wilson,
39 Ill. 2d 275, 277, 235 N.E.2d 561, 562 (1968). The statutory crime of perjury also applies to verified pleadings and affidavits. ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
38, § 32-2(a) (1973); Loraitis v. Kukulka, 1 Ill. 2d 533, 116 N.E.2d 329
(1953).
228. Section 122-6 states:- "If the court finds in favor of the petitioner,
it shall enter an appropriate order .

. . ."

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-

6 (1973) (emphasis added). The statute does not, however, require "an
appropriate order" when relief is denied or the petition is dismissed. Furthermore, it is unclear whether an order would be appropriate if it
merely contained a statement of the ultimate disposition of the case.
229. 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294, 205 N.E.2d 456, 458 (1965).
230. THE ABA STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ILLINOIS COMPLIANCE, Post-Conviction Remedies, § 4.7, Commentary (1974). The study indicates that the use of special findings has not

become a regular practice in hearing courts.
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the dismissal has been on the pleadings,
been denied after a hearing.

28

' or the petition has

Relief Available under the Act
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction judge must determine whether the petitioner has proven the
allegations of his petition by a preponderance of the evidence.
If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, an "appropriate order" must be entered with respect to the judgment or sentence
in the former proceedings, 23 2 and such supplementary orders as
to rearraignment, retrial, 23. custody, bail, or discharge as may be
23 4
necessary and proper.
When the petition is denied, Rule 6 5 1235 provides that the
clerk of the trial court shall at once mail or deliver to the petitioner a notice of the entry of a final order in any post-conviction
proceeding. Where the clerk fails to comply with these requirements, considerations of fundamental fairness will preclude the
23 6
denial of an appeal.
Appellate Practice
Since 1971, appeals from a final judgment of the circuit court
in any post-conviction proceeding lie to the appellate court in the
district in which the circuit court is located. 23 7 Both the petitioner and the State have the right to appeal an adverse judg238
ment.
231. The scope of appellate review should not affect this rationale. On

appeal from a dismissal of a petition without a hearing, the question is
whether the result reached by the post-conviction judge was correct, and

not whether the reasoning was appropriate. People v. Smith, 40 Ill. 2d
140, 239 N.E.2d 814 (1968). The workload of the appellate courts would
undoubtedly be assisted by a requirement of special findings.
232. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1973).
233. E.g., People v. Weakley, 45 Ill. 2d 549, 259 N.E.2d 802 (1970).
234. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1973).
235. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 651 (1973).
236.

E.g., People v. Allen, 7 Ill. App. 3d 249, 287 N.E.2d 171 (1972).

237. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 651 (a)

(1973).

guage of Section 122-7 ("Any final judgment .

.

The permissive lan. may be reviewed by

the Supreme Court as an appeal in civil cases.") has been interpreted by

the supreme court as a grant of authority to provide for review in postconviction proceedings by court rule. LEIGHTON, supra note 4, at 576.
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 vests broad rule-making power in
the supreme court with respect to control over direct appeals. ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 4(b) (1970). Section 122-7 of the Act should be repealed because it conflicts with Supreme Court Rule 651 (a), the governing authority. Fins, Need for Coordination of Illinois Statutes with New

Constitution and Supreme Court Rules Effective July 1, 1971, 5

MAR.J. PRAC. & PROC. 1, 26 (1971).

JOHN

238. E.g., People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954); People
v. Juerke, 6 Ill. App. 3d 559, 286 N.E.2d 110 (1972). An order directing
a new trial is a final judgment which is appealable by the State. People
v. Joyce, 1 Ill. 2d 225, 115 N.E.2d 262 (1953).
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Issues raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. 23 9 Although the proceeding is civil in nature, Supreme Court Rule 651(d) states that the procedure on
appeal "shall be in accordance with the rules governing criminal
appeals, as near as may be. '240 Since the proceeding relates to
alleged constitutional denials in a criminal prosecution, the plain
error rule would seem applicable. 241 The doctrine of funda242
mental fairness supports this view.
On appeal, an indigent petitioner is entitled to a copy of 8the
24
transcript and to be represented by court-appointed counsel.
Rule 651 (c) was amended in 1969 to implement the court decisions 244 with respect to the duties of an attorney representing
an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding. In People
v. Slaughter, the court stated:
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides that counsel shall be
appointed to represent indigent prisoners who request counsel,
and it also provides that a petition may be amended or withdrawn. . . . These provisions were included because it was anticipated that most of the petitions under the Act would be filed
pro se by prisoners who had not had the aid of counsel in their

preparation. To the end that the complaints of a prisoner with
respect to the validity of his conviction might be adequately presented, the statute contemplated that the attorney appointed to
represent an indigent petitioner would consult with him either
by mail or in person, ascertain his alleged grievances, examine
the record of the proceedings at the trial and then amend the
petition that had been filed pro se, so that it would adequately
present the prisoner's constitutional contentions. The statute can
not perform its function unless the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner ascertains the basis of his complaints,
into appropriate legal form and presents
shapes those complaints
245
them to the court.
Supreme Court Rule 651 (c) requires that the court record
affirmatively show an appointment of counsel 246 and the appointed counsel's discharge of certain duties. This showing may
239. E.g., People v.Brouhard, 53 Ill. 2d 109, 290 N.E.2d 206 (1972).
240. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 651(d) (1973). Numerous matters in
criminal appeals are governed by civil appeals rules. See Supreme
Court Rule 612. Id. § 612. On civil appeals see 5A NICHOLS, supra note
93, § 5629 et seq. (1962).
241. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 110A, §§ 366(b), 615(a) (1973).
242. E.g., People v.Kane, 5 Ill. App.3d 60, 282 N.E.2d 496 (1972). Although the constitutional right to remain silent was not raised in the
post-conviction petition, on appeal it was considered and rejected on the
merits.
243. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4; ch. 110A, § 651(c) (1973). Whether
an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is not governed by the doctrine of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Ross v. Moffitt, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (1974).
244. People v. Garrison, 43 Ill. 2d 121, 251 N.E.2d 200 (1969); People

v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).

245. Id. at 284-85, 235 N.E.2d at 569 (citations omitted).
246. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 110A, § 651 (c)(1973).
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be made by a certificate of the petitioner's attorney.2 47 The record must contain a showing
... that the attorney has consulted with the petitioner either
by mail or in person to ascertain his contentions of deprivation
of constitutional right, has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petition
*filed pro se that are necessary
for an adequate presentation of
248
petitioner's contentions.

Only "necessary" amendments need be made. Thus, the failure
to amend the pro se petition does not constitute a violation of
the rule, in the absence of a showing that "specific, identifiable
'249
evidence exists.
When the record does not contain an affirmative showing
that the appointed counsel's duties have been discharged, the pe20
titioner is deemed to have been inadequately represented.
Such a finding will result in the reversal of a judgment dismissing the petition, even though the issues raised in the post-conviction proceeding would be barred by res judicata due to a prior
25 1
direct appeal. '
CONCLUSION

In the last forty years, the concept of due process has expanded, intensifying the conflict between state and federal authorities over the administration of criminal justice. Since the
State has the primary responsibility for the administration of its
criminal laws, it may prescribe the procedures by which this system is governed. The State must, however, provide a post-conviction remedy for the vindication of federal rights. If the frequency with which state prisoners resort to the federal courts
is to be minimized, this remedy must be adequate and effective.
Certain phases of criminal proceedings involve constitutional
questions appearing of record. Ordinarily, these questions can
be resolved by the process of appellate review, since the record
will adequately reflect the issue. Other constitutional claims
cannot be determined on direct appeal because the record will
not furnish the basis for such review. The Post-Conviction Hear247. People v. Roebuck, 7 Ill. App. 3d 7, 286 N.E.2d 149 (1972) (rule
does not require a certificate, provided the record otherwise shows compliance).
248. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 651 (c) (1973). An affirmative showing
in the record is not required with respect to proceedings in which the petition was dismissed prior to January 1, 1970, the effective date of the
rule, provided the representation was in fact adequate. People v. Loy,
52 Ill. 2d 126, 284 N.E.2d 634 (1972); People v. Williams, 5 Ill. App. 3d
56, 282 N.E.2d 503 (1972).
249. E.g., People v. Stovall, 47 Ill. 2d 42, 46, 264 N.E.2d 174, 176 (1970),

cert. denied, 402 U.S. 997 (1971).

250. E.g., People v. Terry, 46 Ill. 2d 75, 262 N.E.2d 923 (1970).
251. People v. Brittain, 52 Ill. 2d 91, 284 N.E.2d 632 (1972).
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ing Act, though not limited to these latter claims, was designed
primarily for them.
The post-conviction proceeding provides a remedy by which
state and federal claims of constitutional denial can be raised and
adjudicated in a collateral proceeding. The Act does not replace
other collateral remedies, such as state habeas corpus or the petition under Section 72. Rather, like these remedies, the post-conviction proceeding is a new and independent investigation which
is neither a substitute for an appeal, nor a limited review by an
intermediate appellate court.
Although the post-conviction proceeding has been termed
civil in nature, its unique statutory purposes have led some
courts to describe it as sui generis. The procedures by which the
remedy is governed should not, however, depend upon whether
the proceeding is characterized as civil or criminal. The purposes
of the Act are not furthered by labeling it one or the other. The
Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized this principle in its requirement that the petition must be judged on its substance.
The quality of the proceeding could be further improved by
the adoption of court rules permitting discovery and requiring
the entry of special findings, and by providing a less restrictive
policy with respect to assignment of judges. The procedures
must be adapted to promote the unique purposes of the Act and
to ensure that a fair hearing will not be denied.
Alan Rabunski

NOTE: In United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, No. 73-1883
(7th Cir., Aug. 29, 1974), petitioner failed to appeal the dismissal of a post-conviction petition after his conviction had been
affirmed. As this issue went to press, the court of appeals
broadly held that a federal habeas corpus petition "should be
dismissed for failure to exhaust this state remedy only if there
is direct precedent indicating that under the particular circumstances of a prisoner's case the waiver doctrine will be relaxed."
The opinion stated that the Illinois courts' application of res
judicata and waiver renders the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
an "ineffective" remedy as to claims appearing of record.
State prisoners may apparently file a federal petition after
the conviction is affirmed and forgo the post-conviction remedy
if all claims appear of record, thus restricting most state petitions to claims beyond the record. Illinois courts could avoid
this result by limiting res judicata and waiver to issues actually
decided on appeal; hence, claims appearing of record, but not
raised on appeal, could be adjudicated in a post-conviction proceeding. But, if res judicata and waiver are applied as in the
past, the court of appeals "will not allow" itself "to become a
part of this merry-go-round procedure."
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APPENDIX
Post-Conviction Hearing Act
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to 122-7 (1973).
122-1. Petition in the Trial Court.
Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United
States or of the State of Illinois or both may institute a proceeding under this Article. The proceeding shall be commenced
by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction
took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by
affidavit. Petitioner shall also serve another copy upon the
State's Attorney by any of the methods provided in Rule [11]
of the Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the petition upon
his receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention
of the court. No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 20 years after rendition of final judgment,
unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was
not due to his culpable negligence.
122-2. Contents of Petition.
The petition shall identify the proceeding in which the petitioner
was convicted, give the date of the rendition of the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the respects in which
petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. The petition
shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not
attached. The petition shall identify any previous proceedings
that the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of authorities
shall be omitted from the petition.
122-3. Waiver of Claims.
Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised
in the original or an amended petition is waived.
122-4. Pauper Petitions.
If the petition alleges that the petitioner is unable to pay the
costs of the proceeding, the court may order that the petitioner
be permitted to proceed as a poor person and order a transcript
of the proceedings delivered to petitioner in accordance with Rule
of the Supreme Court. If the petitioner is without counsel and
alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state
whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent
him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall
appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to
procure counsel.
122-5. Proceedings on Petition.
Within 30 days after the filing and docketing of the petition,
or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall
answer or move to dismiss. No other or further pleadings shall
be filed except as the court may order on its own motion or
on that of either party. The court may in its discretion grant
leave, at any stage of the proceeding prior to entry of judgment,
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to withdraw the petition. The court may in its discretion make
such order as to amendment of the petition or any other pleading,
or as to pleading over, or filing further pleadings, or extending
the' time of filing any pleading other than the original petition,
as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally
provided in civil cases.
122-6. Disposition in Trial Court.
The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order
the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. If the
court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate
order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former
proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment,
retrial, custody, bail or discharge as may be necessary and proper.
122-7. Review.
Any final judgment entered upon such petition may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court as an appeal in civil cases.

